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Mechanisms for Decisions 
about the Future 
Jeffrey R. Stevens 
Abstract 
Evolutionary and psychological perspectives on decision making remain largely sepa-
rate endeavors. The bounded rationality approach integrates these two perspectives by 
focusing on simple, plausible mechanisms of decision making and the cognitive ca-
pacities needed to implement these mechanisms. Decisions about the future provide a 
class of decisions that lend themselves to a bounded rationality approach. Though many 
different mechanisms may exist for making decisions about the future, only a subset of 
these mechanisms actually require a representation of the future. The bounded rational-
ity approach helps focus on the cognitive capacities and decision mechanisms that are 
necessary for a full understanding of decision making about the future. 
Introduction 
A hungry female chimpanzee spies a termite mound and quickly fashions a 
branch into a long, thin twig. She then digs to uncover a tunnel in the mound 
and inserts her twig. Soon, she extracts the twig, revealing a dozen wriggling 
termites clinging on tightly. The expert angler carefully plucks off and con-
sumes each insect. As she repeats the process, she depletes the soldier termites 
arriving to defend their nest. When should she leave this hole to either excavate 
another tunnel or seek a new mound altogether? What decision mechanism 
does she use to make this choice? What cognitive capacities does she need 
to implement this mechanism? This foraging situation raises numerous other 
questions to biologists and psychologists interested in decision making in both 
humans and nonhuman animals. 
Tinbergen (1963) posited four levels of analysis for why a behavior exists: the 
phylogenetic, functional, developmental, and mechanistic levels. Evolutionary 
biologists largely focus on why behavioral decisions exist from a functional 
perspective. For example, what benefit exists for leaving the termite hole now 
versus in ten minutes? Psychologists, in contrast, explore the mechanistic level, 
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typically concentrating on cognitive mechanisms involved in decision making. 
For instance, what information does the chimpanzee use to decide when to 
leave, and how does she acquire this information? Regrettably, the functional 
and mechanistic studies of decision making have remained largely separate en-
deavors, with many behavioral biologists and psychologists reluctant to cross 
disciplinary boundaries. Yet, the emergence of cognitive ecology and evolu-
tionary psychology as fields demonstrates a recent push to integrate behav-
ioral function and mechanism across species (e.g., Barkow et al. 1992; Dukas 
1998; Hammerstein and Hagen 2005; Kacelnik 2006; McNamara and Houston 
2009). This integration should be taken seriously when constructing models 
of cognitive mechanisms and evolutionary outcomes. Here, I highlight how 
an integration of evolutionary and psychological approaches is integral to an 
understanding of decision making. First, I discuss the importance of decision 
mechanisms and review two general approaches to studying decision making. 
In particular, the bounded rationality approach proposes simple mechanisms 
by which decisions are made. This emphasis on the decision mechanisms and 
the cognitive capacities required for the mechanisms may yield a more realistic 
understanding of how humans and other animals make decisions. Thereafter, 
I explore a particular class of decisions that address the future. Specifically, I 
focus on how individuals make decisions that yield benefits in the future and 
what kinds of cognitive capacities and representations of the future are needed 
for these decisions. 
Mechanisms of Decision Making 
Broadly defined, a decision is the result of an evaluation of possible options. 
This definition does not commit to a particular process (conscious or other-
wise) and can be applied across a wide range of taxa (potentially to plants as 
well; Kacelnik 2003). Decisions can take a variety offorms, including both in-
ferences and preferences. Inferences go beyond the information given to make 
predictions about the/ state of the world; for instance, knowing the color of a 
fruit, can a decision maker infer its ripeness and sugar content? In contrast, 
preferences rank the desirability of options; for instance, would a decision 
maker prefer to receive a small food item now or a large food item tomorrow? 
Though I distinguish between inferences and preferences as separate entities, 
they can interact such that inferences can feed into preference decisions and 
vice versa. 
Approaches to Rationality 
The nature of rational decision making has been debated for centuries. Over 
this time, two perspectives on decision making have emerged: unbounded ra-
tionality and bounded rationality. 
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Unbounded Rationality 
Historically, many models of decision making have been based on the Homo 
economicus or "economic man" perspective in which decision makers can ac-
cess all information relevant to a decision and arrive at optimal inferences via 
rules of logic and statistics (e.g., Bayes's rule, linear regression) or exhibit 
optimal preferences via rules of probability (e.g., expected utilities). An un-
boundedly rational decision maker uses all information available to arrive at 
the decision producing an optimal outcome. Proponents of unbounded ratio-
nality focus on the optimal outcomes and typically skirt claims about the pro-
cess of decision making by stating that agents behave "as if' they are rational 
(Berg and Gigerenzer 2010). Nevertheless, any claims of unbounded rational-
ity require that agents possess sophisticated mental inference or preference 
functions that, when supplied with all relevant information, output the optimal 
decision. Deviations from the norms oflinear regression, Bayes's rule, or ex-
pected utility are considered normatively "irrational" behavior. 
The unbounded rationality models imply an implausibly omniscient, tem-
porally unconstrained, and computationally unlimited decision maker. There 
are, however, examples in which agents seem to make unboundedly rational 
decisions (Glimcher 2003; GlOckner 2008). Yet, typically these models are 
feasible only in specific, "small-world" circumstances (Savage 1954), and the 
generality of their application remains unclear. Moreover, even if organisms 
possess the ability to use higher-order cognitive skills such as optimal decision 
making, they do not necessarily do so when simpler solutions will suffice. For 
instance, cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) use simpler, more approxi-
mate amount-based mechanisms when discriminating different quantities of 
food, even though they can use more sophisticated and precise number-based 
mechanisms in other situations (Stevens et al. 2007). Thus, though unbound-
edly rational models are mathematically tractable and elegant, they do not offer 
realistic accounts of decision-making mechanisms in complex environments. 
Bounded Rationality 
An alternative to the omniscience and unlimited computational power required 
of Homo economicus is a perspective that emphasizes a more realistic view 
of tools available to decision makers. The bounded rationality approach ad-
vocates a plausible notion of the capacities of and constraints on the mind, 
as well as the interaction of the mind and the decision-making environment 
(Gigerenzer and Selten 2001; Simon 1956). This bounded rationality approach 
implies a set of computationally simple heuristics that use only partial infor-
mation to make good, robust decisions that apply to specific decision-making 
environments (Payne et al. 1993; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2010). That is, 
rather than having general-purpose statistical devices that require extensive 
information and complicated computations, decision makers often succeed by 
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using less information and simple heuristics specifically adapted to their en-
vironment. The simple-heuristics approach makes explicit predictions about 
the decision process, the outcomes, and the conditions under which heuristics 
will work. 
An evolutionary perspective on decision making highlights the gap between 
unbounded and bounded rationality. Many models of decision making in ani-
mals use optimization to find the best solution to a decision problem. However, 
despite using unboundedly rational models, behavioral biologists do not sug-
gest that animals use optimal decision mechanisms. Optimization models are 
used only because natural selection approximates an optimizing process under 
constraints. Instead, biologists often assume that animals use rules of thumb 
(heuristics) that approach optimal outcomes. Consequently, the evolutionary 
perspective on decision making distinguishes between optimal outcomes and 
feasible mechanisms that can approach those outcomes. 
Animals use rules of thumb in a number of important decision-making con-
texts, ranging from navigation to nest construction (Marsh 2002; Hutchinson 
and Gigerenzer 2005; Stevens and King 2011). As an example, biologists have 
investigated the use of simple rules in the "patch-choice" model of foraging 
(Stephens and Krebs 1986; Wilke et al. 2009) described in the chimpanzee ter-
mite-fishing example. Recall that in this scenario, foragers must decide when 
to leave a patch and move on to another. The optimal policy recommends leav-
ing when the intake rate at the current patch equals the average intake rate for 
the remaining patches under this policy. Calculating or estimating this average 
intake rate in the environment may be computationally difficult in complex en-
vironments. A number of researchers have proposed simple patch-leaving rules 
that avoid some of the complicated computations (Figure 7.1). For instance, 
rather than comparing the current intake rate to the average rate, animals may 
just leave a patch when the current intake rate drops below a critical threshold. 
Other even simpler rules dispense with the requirement of directly monitoring 
the current intake rate and instead indirectly estimate this rate. Animals using 
these rules may leave after consuming a certain number of prey items (fixed 
number rule), after a certain time period after arriving to a patch (fixed time 
rule), or after a certain time period of unsuccessful foraging (giving-up time 
rule). Empirical evidence suggests that different species use these various rules 
in different foraging situations (Stephens and Krebs 1986; van Alphen et al. 
2003; Wajnberg et al. 2003). 
The use of simple rules and heuristics by animals is not surprising. This 
perspective, however, has stimulated more controversy when applied to human 
decision making (see Todd and Gigerenzer 2000 and subsequent commentar-
ies). Do humans use simple heuristics for important decisions? Gigerenzer and 
colleagues argue that in certain environments heuristics can achieve good out-
comes. Given that the human brain has been built by evolution through natural 
selection, we might suppose that the costs of decision computations weigh 
heavily in the evolution of decision mechanisms, and mechanisms with simple 
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Figure 7.1 Biologists have tested a number of patch-leaving rules. (a) With an in-
cremental rule for deciding when to leave a patch, each resource capture (indicated by 
small arrows) increases the probability of staying in a patch. (b) With a decremental 
rule, each resource capture reduces the probability of staying. (c) With a giving-up time 
rule, the tendency to stay in the patch declines with unsuccessful search and is reset 
to a maximum with each resource found. (d) With a fixed-number rule, a patch is left 
after a fixed number of items have been found. (e) With a fixed-time rule, the patch is 
left independent of the number of food items found. Reprinted with permission of the 
Cognitive Science Society from Wilke et al. (2009). 
decision rules tend to prevail over complex computations when yielding simi-
lar outcomes. 
The bounded rationality approach involves not only an exploration ofheu-
ristics and other decision mechanisms but also an investigation of the cognitive 
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capacities that underlie these mechanisms. This is particularly useful when 
studying the evolution of deciSion making, because species differ in their un-
derlying capacities and therefore may differ in which decision mechanisms 
they can implement. Consequently, carefully outlining the required capacities 
is critical for studying the mechanism. As an example, though tit-for-tat and 
similar strategies have been promoted as simple decision rules that can gener-
ate cooperation (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Nowak 2006), the underlying 
capacities needed to implement these strategies have not been well studied 
(Stevens and Hauser 2004). When measuring memory capacity, for instance, 
it seems unlikely that even humans have the memory structure and accuracy 
required to implement tit-for-tat (Stevens et al. 2011). Thus, consideration of 
the underlying cognition needed for decision rules will help constrain the pos-
sible list of feasible mechanisms. 
To summarize, the unbounded rationality approach to decision making focuses 
on optimal outcomes, whereas the bounded rationality approach emphasizes the 
cognitive mechanisms of decision making. In addition to testing decision heuris-
tics, the bounded rationality approach highlights the importance of investigating the 
underlying cognitive capacities needed for decision mechanisms. With this general 
overview of bounded rationality in hand, we can now focus on a more specific class 
of decisions. 
Making Decisions about the Future 
Most ofthe decisions made by animals, humans included, involve some aspects 
of the future. Individuals must make inferences about the future (e.g., predicting 
the presence of a predator at a goal destination) as well as preferences about the 
future (e.g., investing in social partners to achieve future rewards). Here, I focus 
on a subset of preferences about the future known as intertemporal choices; that 
is, choices between options with future rewards (Read 2004; Stevens 20 1 Ob). 
The termite-fishing chimpanzee introduced earlier in this chapter faces an 
intertemporal choice. Should she continue fishing in the current termite mound 
to extract more food or move on to another mound? From searching for food 
and mates to investing in territory, offspring, and social partners, intertemporal 
choices are ubiquitous in animal decision making. Researchers have studied these 
kinds of questions under a host of different names: delayed gratification, impul-
sivity, patience, self-control, temporal discounting. The key feature of these deci-
sions is that animals act now to influence their future state, sometimes at a cost to 
their current state. Can animals forgo immediate benefits for delayed ones? 
The Psychology of Intertemporal Choice 
Some of the most amazing instances of waiting for delayed rewards in ani-
mals come from species that cache food for the winter. Nutcrackers (Nucifraga 
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columbiana) can bury 33,000 pine seeds each winter and wait months to re-
cover them (Vander Wall and Balda 1977). Every year, these birds make thou-
sands of intertemporal choices in which they choose between an immediate, 
smaller (relative) payoff versus a larger (relative) payoff in the future. How 
do they and the myriad other caching species make these decisions? Do they 
have a concept of the harsh conditions facing them in the coming months and 
plan accordingly? Or are there other ways to solve this problem? Animals can 
make intertemporal choices in a variety of ways. Indeed, many kinds of inter-
temporal choices do not require a representation of the future or any kind of 
planning ability. Though there are likely more, below I explore four types of 
mechanisms that may yield intertemporal choices: simple rules, reinforcement 
decay, reinforcement rate, and temporal discounting. 
Simple Rules 
In many cases, animals may use simple rules to make intertemporal choices. 
These rules do not require a representation of the future, and they may not 
even need any estimates of time. This is likely the case in many instances of 
caching. Rather than anticipate the future dearth of food, caching species im-
plement simple strategies that respond to salient environmental variables. For 
caching, this probably entails a propensity to cache modulated by hormonal 
variations that result from changes in day length. Indeed, in the laboratory, 
experimenters elicit caching behavior in seasonal caching species by reducing 
the daily light:dark ratio (e.g., Pravosudov et al. 2010). This is not to say that 
caching is not flexible. On the contrary, much of the evidence of caching in 
corvids suggests remarkable flexibility in their caching decisions, depending 
on social context and the caching environment (Clayton et al. 2005; Emery and 
Clayton 2001). 
As another example, parasitoid wasps (Leptopilina heterotoma) lay more 
eggs in lower-quality hosts when an impending storm is coming (Roitberg et 
al. 1992). Rather than assessing the future uncertainty of the storm and dump-
ing eggs in anticipation of possibly losing the opportunity to lay, the wasps 
respond directly to manipulations of barometric pressure. Thus, various spe-
cies use rather simple rules to convert environmental input into intertemporal 
choices. In these situations, the animals do not represent the future or any ele-
ments of time or reward magnitude. Instead, they respond rather directly to 
environmental cues. 
Reinforcement Decay 
In their natural habitats, animals continually face intertemporal choices. Yet, 
most of the work on intertemporal choice in animals occurs in the laboratory 
under operant conditions (e.g., Green and Myerson 2004). These studies often 
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present two stimuli to signal the options. For instance, choosing a blue circle 
results in a smaller food amount available sooner, and choosing a yellow square 
yields a larger food amount available later. Laboratory studies offer the advan-
tages of tight control over the reward magnitudes and delays, allowing precise 
manipulation of relevant factors for intertemporal choices. The artificial nature 
of the task, however, allows alternative accounts of the phenomenon of inter-
est. Rather than choosing between future rewards, the animals may simply 
be choosing between two reinforcement decay rates; that is, the strength of 
the association between the stimuli and the reward decays with the time since 
last reinforcement. Therefore, choices may be based on the past reinforcement 
history (decaying stimulus strength) instead of the future payoffs. Using oper-
ant paradigms does not necessitate the decay explanation, but it does offer an 
alternative that does not consider future states. 
One solution is to replace the arbitrary stimuli with the actual rewards, so 
that subjects choose between the rewards rather than stimuli (Stevens et al. 
2005c; Rosati et al. 2007). An additional solution is to switch from a purely 
temporal task to a spatial task. In these tasks, animals choose between smaller, 
closer rewards and larger, more distant ones (Stevens et al. 2005c; Miihloff et 
al. 2011). Therefore, the animals can see both the rewards and the cost required 
to obtain the rewards (the spatial distance). These kinds of spatial tasks mimic 
natural foraging problems (Janson 2007; Noser and Byrne 2007) and can miti-
gate reinforcement decay explanations of intertemporal choice. 
Reinforcement Rate 
As an alternative to the reinforcement decay explanation, animals may be at-
tending to reinforcement rate or intake rate; that is, the number of rewards 
per unit time. To use these rates, individuals must have some estimate of the 
reward magnitudes and time delays. Research in numerical competence and 
timing suggests that animals can estimate both quantity and time (Brannon 
2006; Gibbon 1977; Haun et al. 2010). Moreover, combining quantity and 
time into a rate is a core principle of behavioral ecological studies of foraging 
(Stephens and Krebs 1986) and psychological accounts of learning (Skinner 
1938; Gallistel1990). 
Animals can use at least two types of reinforcement rates. Short-term rates 
focus only on the delay from choice to reward acquisition, whereas long-term 
rates include the time it takes to consume rewards as well as the time be-
tween trials. Intertemporal choice studies using blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) 
and cotton-top tamarins (s. oedipus) are consistent with using short-term rates 
(Stephens and Anderson 2001; Stevens et al. 2005b), whereas choices of bono-
bos (Pan paniscus) may be consistent with long-term rates (Rosati et al. 2007). 
After the rates are estimated, two different decision rules can be employed 
to make a choice: maximizing and matching. Maximizing predicts that indi-
viduals will compare the rates of available options and exclusively choose the 
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option with the higher rate. Matching, in contrast, predicts the distribution of 
choices in proportion to the relative rates across the options. If, for example, 
one option offered a reinforcement rate that is twice as high as that from anoth-
er option, the higher rate option would be chosen in approximately 67% of the 
choices (Herrnstein 1961). An extended debate on the importance of matching 
versus maximizing remains unresolved (Commons et al. 1982; Logue et al. 
1990) and has not been properly separated from the short- versus long-term 
rate issue. 
Temporal Discounting 
Probably the most commonly studied explanation of intertemporal choice 
is temporal discounting (Frederick et al. 2002). The discounting approach 
suggests that the present value of a future reward decreases with the delay 
to receiving that reward. The discounted value function requires estimates 
of both reward magnitude and future delay, so this mechanism requires an 
understanding of the future. In fact, some argue that temporal discounting 
and future planning or prospective memory are intertwined (Critchfield and 
Madden 2007). 
Much of the work on animal intertemporal choice attributes the choice 
to discounting without testing whether a discounting mechanism is at work 
(Green and Myerson 2004). Indeed, the work on human intertemporal choice 
also relies on the discounting explanation. When making a choice between, 
say, $100 today and $105 in 3 weeks, economists suggest that people discount 
the value of the future reward. The discounting approach assesses how the 
present value of the delayed reward decreases with the time to receiving the 
reward. In both humans and other animals, this value appears to decrease with 
time delay in a hyperbolic way; that is, the rate of discounting decreases as the 
delay increases (Figure 7.2). 
This hyperbolic pattern of choices, though consistent with a discounting ex-
planation, is not unique to discounting. In fact, the reinforcement rate approach 
also produces behavior consistent with a hyperbolic decrease in value (Figure 
7.2). In addition, a simple rule can account for this pattern, a rule that humans 
could be using. Rubinstein (2003) and Leland (2002) suggest that rather than 
making intertemporal choices based on discounting, humans may compare 
the two reward amounts or the two time delays and assess their similarity. If 
one attribute (amount or delay) is similar but the other not, then the decision 
maker would ignore the similar attribute and just focus on the other one. In the 
monetary example, for instance, one might consider $100 and $105 similar, 
thereby using the delays to decide and choosing the sooner option. When this 
rule can be used, it can outperform the discounting models in some situations 
(Stevens 2009), suggesting that simple rules may account for some instances 
of discounting-like behavior. 
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Figure 7.2 Temporal discounting explanations assume that individuals devalue future 
rewards. Though the hyperbolic discounting model fits animal data quite well, other 
mechanisms of intertemporal choice, such as rate maximization, also show a hyperbolic 
pattern. 
Intertemporal Choice Mechanisms 
Numerous mechanisms exist that allow organisms to make intertemporal 
choices, and I have provided by no means an exhaustive list. The critical 
point is that considering the mechanism has important implications for how 
we study intertemporal choice. First, it influences what kinds of models are 
relevant. The bulk of work on intertemporal choice uses temporal discount-
ing models to investigate this behavior, both for humans and other animals. 
In the experimental paradigms of intertemporal choice, however, alternative 
nondiscounting mechanisims may account for these choices. When given bi-
nary forced choices between two options, humans may use similarity rather 
than discounting. Similarly, animals may use reinforcement rate or decay to 
make their choices in operant experiments. Again, though most studies of in-
tertemporal choice assume temporal discounting, few spell out and test a clear 
discounting mechanism. 
A mechanistic approach also highlights the underlying cognitive capaci-
ties needed to implement the mechanisms. Simple rules used by the parasitoid 
wasp require only a barometer. The similarity rule proposed for human inter-
temporal choices needs the ability to categorize amounts and times as similar 
or different. Temporal discounting involves an understanding of the future, but 
the type of understanding is not well studied. How do individuals assess the 
future? How is the future incorporated into the decision-making mechanism? 
Which types of future cognition are required and which types are optional? 
For instance, though mental time travel might be a useful capacity to have 
when implementing temporal discounting decisions, it may not be necessary 
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for them to be made. However, other theories of intertemporal choice frame the 
choices as a problem of "multiple selves" in which one must mentally travel 
in time to determine which future self would be best (Frederick et al. 2002). 
Clearly, these models require a different set of cognitive abilities. 
Though formulating different decision mechanisms is useful, empirically 
testing between these mechanisms may be difficult. In many cases, they make 
similar predictions at the behavioral level. Thus, purely behavioral outcome 
measures may not suffice to discriminate among them. Instead, measures of 
process are needed to test between mechanisms (Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al. 
2010). These measures may include reaction times, eye tracking, active infor-
mation search, and physiological and neurological measures. Shapiro, Siller, 
and Kacelnik (2008), for instance, propose a model of intertemporal choice 
that successfully uses process data to predict choices in starlings (Sturn us vul-
garis). Their sequential choice model takes reaction times (response latencies) 
to a single option in the absence of choice to predict choices when multiple op-
tions are presented simultaneously. At the moment, few intertemporal choice 
models are well specified enough at the mechanistic level to provide appropri-
ate process predictions. The sequential choice model provides a nice example 
of the importance of incorporating decision mechanisms into models of inter-
temporal choice. 
Summary 
A truly integrative study of decision making must synthesize evolutionary and 
psychological approaches. Though the emerging fields of cognitive ecology 
and evolutionary psychology have begun this integration, much work remains. 
The bounded rationality approach offers a promising perspective that high-
lights the importance of studying simple mechanisms of decision making. In 
contrast to unbounded rationality's assumptions of omniscient agents with lim-
itless time and computational ability, bounded rationality begins with reason-
able approximations of how the mind works. Boundedly rational agents often 
use rather simple heuristics when they perform well. Moreover, this approach 
emphasizes the cognitive capacities that must be in place to implement various 
decision mechanisms. 
The bounded rationality approach can assist us in understanding decisions 
about the future. In particular, intertemporal choices involve future benefits, 
and a number of explanations have been proposed to account for these deci-
sions. Yet, these explanations have not been fully worked out at the mecha-
nistic level, and each mechanism requires different cognitive capacities and 
representations of the future. Temporal discounting seems to require some kind 
of understanding of the future, but other explanations can account for many 
instances of intertemporal choices without the need for a representation of the 
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future. More specific mechanistic models are needed to better understand how 
organisms make decisions about the future. 
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